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Kant’s distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment in the third Critique is not 
well understood in the literature. A mainstream view unifies these by making determination the telos of all 
acts of judgment (Longuenesse 1998). On this view, all reflection is primarily in the business of producing 
empirical concepts for cognition, and thus has what I call a determinative ideal. I argue that this view fails 
to take seriously the independence and autonomy of the ‘power of judgment’ [Urteilskraft] as a higher 
cognitive faculty in its own right with its own a priori principle. Instead of seeing merely reflecting 
judgments as failed or incomplete acts of judgment, I argue that these are in fact paradigmatic of the activity 
of the power of judgment. More precisely, the reflecting power of judgment just is the power of judgment. 
Accordingly, reflecting judgment takes precedence over determining judgment—for while the former 
operates according to a law that it gives itself, the latter requires another higher cognitive faculty to provide 
its principle. On my view, reflecting judgment should be understood as the capacity for purposive 
subsumption, which is most clearly seen in the activity of mere reflection.  
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Despite an increased interest in Kant’s third Critique in recent years, very little attention 
has been paid to the power of judgment [Urteilskraft] itself—and, with it, Kant’s distinction 
between its ‘determining’ [bestimmend] and ‘reflecting’ [reflectirend] use (KU 5:179).1 
Commentators have generally restricted their focus to either the aesthetic or teleological 
 
1 English translations of Kant are from the Cambridge Editions of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s 
works are cited according to the Akademie Ausgabe pagination (volume number: page number) with the 
appropriate abbreviation (listed below in the reference section)—with the exception of KrV for which I 
provide the standard A/B pagination.  
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domains, rarely stepping back to consider the precise nature of the faculty of the mind that both 
undergoes critique and is responsible for producing the various kinds of judgments Kant 
discusses in the text. Those who have raised the issue of how to unify the two parts of the text 
generally see Kant’s primary concerns in the third Critique (especially as outlined in the 
introductory material)2 as epistemological (Ginsborg 2015; Zuckert 2007). Accordingly, much of 
this scholarship has focused on showing its relevance for Kant’s account of cognition in the first 
Critique (Kukla 2006).3 While many of these commentators tend to neglect the power of 
judgment, their approach nonetheless entails a view according to which it has fundamentally 
cognitive aims and is therefore significant primarily for making cognition possible. On this 
reading, reflecting judgment is chiefly directed at the formation of empirical concepts and laws 
to be employed in determining judgment. As a result, they are committed to saying that the 
‘merely reflecting’ [bloß reflectirende] judgments which occupy the body of the text are failed or 
incomplete judgments. In this essay I wish to challenge this view. On my account, reflecting 
judgment is paradigmatic of the activity of the power of judgment—and thus takes precedence 
over determining judgment. 
My discussion proceeds as follows: I begin by situating the power of judgment within 
Kant’s Critical faculty psychology, as well as against the backdrop of his German Rationalist 
predecessors—none of whom recognised a distinct judging power (§1). After discussing the 
emergence of the power of judgment in the first Critique, I motivate the problem of the 
 
2 I lean heavily on such passages throughout the paper. Kant wrote two introductions to the third Critique, 
though only the second one was published. Given my purposes, I find Kant’s articulation of certain points 
in the so-called First Introduction [FI] often more helpful and precise. This is not to suggest that the 
published Introduction is inadequate. Moreover, there is no sense among commentators that these are at 
odds with each other. Still, when possible, I cite a comparable or parallel passage from the published 
Introduction to try to maintain continuity. 
3 See also Zammito, for whom Kant’s account of reflecting judgment indicates a decidedly ‘cognitive turn’ 
(1992, 151-177). 
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relationship between the determining and reflecting power of judgment as it appears in the third 
Critique (§2). There is no consensus as to what this distinction amounts to—nor does there seem 
to be an obvious and incontrovertible way of uniting the seemingly disparate acts of 
determination and reflection. In other words, what is common to both mental operations such 
that they can each be seen as species of a singular faculty called judgment? I then discuss the 
most prominent account of this relationship (§3). For Longuenesse, determination is the telos of 
all acts of judgment. This view ascribes to the power of judgment what I call a determinative 
ideal.4 Against this, I argue that restricting the aim of reflecting judgment to the generation of 
empirical concepts for determinate cognition is incompatible with the independence of the power 
of judgment as a capacity of the mind with its own a priori legislative principle. Indeed, this path 
risks rendering the third Critique superfluous. In what remains, I argue for a more promising 
solution. In reflecting, judgment pursues its own ends, which derive from its status as a higher 
cognitive faculty (§4). In particular, I show that reflecting judgment itself has a subsumptive 
structure, which is exhibited in the activity of mere reflection and indeed more fundamental than 
that of determining judgment. Only those acts that are guided solely by the principle of 
purposiveness express the autonomy of the power of judgment (which Kant calls ‘heautonomy’). 
By contrast, determining judgment is not on par with reflecting judgment, for its principle is 
always provided by another higher cognitive faculty (either the understanding or reason) (§5). 
Thus, in addition to exclusively characterising the specificity of the mind’s power of judging, 
 
4 I should note at the outset that the vast majority of commentators who discuss these issues subscribe to 
something like the determinative ideal. For example, Ginsborg maintains that the third Critique is 
‘explicitly concerned with the issue [of the formation of] empirical concepts’ (2015, 84). Similarly, Zuckert 
holds that Kant’s primary aim in KU is to provide a necessary ‘supplement to his epistemology’ in KrV 
(2007, 1). I focus on Longuenesse here because she takes up this issue in the most direct way. For most 
others, the idea that reflecting judgment is subordinate to determining judgment is either implicit or merely 
gestured at.  
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reflecting judgment also functions as the subjective condition of possibility for any determination 
whatsoever. I conclude by discussing the way that my account unifies the power of judgment in 
general, understood as the capacity for purposive subsumption (§6).  
 
1. Situating the power of judgment within Kant’s Critical faculty psychology 
Before taking on the issue of the relationship between determining and reflecting judgment, 
it is important to situate the power of judgment within Kant’s faculty psychology. Terms such as 
‘faculty’ [Vermögen], ‘capacity’ [Fähigkeit], and ‘power’ [Kraft] have technical meanings for both 
Kant and his German Rationalist predecessors.5 For our purposes, it is of particular importance to 
get clear on the distinction between what Kant calls the ‘capacity to judge’ (or ‘faculty of 
judgment’) [Vermögen zu urteilen] and the ‘power of judgment’ [Urteilskraft]. While the latter is 
the focus of this essay, its relationship to the former needs to be addressed at the outset. 
Kant follows Baumgarten and Wolff in dividing the fundamental faculty of cognition into 
higher and lower parts, often characterised as ‘understanding’ [Verstand] and ‘sensibility’ 
[Sinnlichkeit] (Anth 7:399). For Baumgarten, the distinction between higher and lower is one of 
degree; the understanding provides distinct representations, while sensibility yields only indistinct 
ones (M  §533, 624). Kant, however, holds that this is a difference in kind pertaining the origin of 
our representations—a view he first argues for in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770). The lower 
faculty of cognition is ‘a power to have representations so far as we are affected by objects,’ while 
the higher faculty of cognition is ‘a power to have representations from ourselves’ (LM 28:228; cf. 
 
5 For an excellent and thorough study of these terms (especially Vermögen) and their context in Eighteenth 
century German philosophy, see chapter 1 of Falduto (2014). 
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LM 29:880). Kant characterises this as a distinction between receptivity/passivity and 
spontaneity/activity.  
In the pre-critical period, Kant also follows his predecessors by distinguishing within the 
higher cognitive faculty two sub-faculties: the understanding [Verstand] and reason [Vernunft].6 
However, Kant goes beyond his predecessors in describing these as nothing but two different ways 
of judging (immediate and mediate). Indeed, he even goes as far as to describe them as jointly 
comprising the ‘capacity to judge’ [Vermögen zu urteilen] (FS 2:59)—a term he would use again, 
more famously, in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] (A69/B94). 
In other words, Kant prioritises judgment within his conception of the mind, even before 
recognising a distinct judging power.7 
By the time Kant writes KrV, his division of the higher cognitive faculty is threefold and 
now includes the power of judgment [Urteilskraft] (A131/B169).8 What’s more, Kant now refers 
to all three of these as the ‘capacity to judge’ [Vermögen zu urteilen].9 However, the relationship 
between this new ‘power’ [Kraft] and the broader ‘capacity’ [Vermögen] of which it is ostensibly 
a part is hardly clear. Kant defines the power of judgment by way of a contrast with the 
 
6 Kant employs the term ‘understanding’ both in the broad sense (denoting the higher cognitive faculty in 
general) and in the narrow sense (referring to one of its sub-faculties) (KrV A130-131/B169, cf. A69/B94, 
A126; Anth 7:196; FI 20:201; LM 28:240; LA 25:537, 773). 
7 While Baumgarten recognises a faculty of judgment [facultas diiudicandi], he characterises it as the 
capacity to ‘perceive the perfections and imperfections of things’ (M §606). He distinguishes between its 
sensible and intelligible use, depending on whether one represents the harmony or disharmony of things 
indistinctly or distinctly; the former he calls ‘taste,’ the latter ‘criticism’ (ibid, §607). This strictly evaluative 
capacity, which does not lie strictly with the higher or lower faculty of cognition, does not bear any direct 
relation to Kant’s new power of judgment. Moreover, we know that Kant objects to the idea that there could 
be rules for taste, which is to say, that aesthetics could be a science (KrV A21/B35-36). 
8 Recent commentators have shown that Kant begins to develop a theory of Urteilskraft in his unpublished 
anthropology lectures in the 1770s (McAndrew 2015; Sánchez Rodriguez 2012). I cite some of these 
passages in what follows. 
9 ‘…the understanding in general can be represented as a capacity to judge’ [der Verstand überhaupt als 
sein Vermögen zu urteilen vorgestellt werden kann] (KrV A69/B94). 
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understanding, the faculty of rules: it is ‘the faculty of subsuming under rules [das Vermögen unter 
Regeln zu subsumiren], i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule … or not’ 
(KrV A132/B171). In subsuming specific cases under general notions, the power of judgment is 
not instructed by rules, on pain of regress: there would need to be further rules ad infinitum. The 
ability to determine whether or not a particular instantiates a rule is ultimately ‘a special talent’ 
which ‘cannot be taught but only practised’ (A133/B172). With no special principle to guide it, its 
operations are ultimately mysterious. Further, the power of judgment seems to find its identity 
only in relation to the understanding, which it assists by applying the rules that it is given.  
Unfortunately, there are many inconsistencies in the way Kant employs terms like ‘power’ 
[Kraft] and ‘faculty’ [Vermögen] in his faculty psychology. For example, Kant will sometimes 
refer to the understanding, power of judgment, and reason as ‘faculties’ [der oberen 
Erkenntnißvermögen], and other times as ‘powers’ [die obern Kräfte der Seele; Gemütskräfte] (AL 
25:147, 537; KrV 130-131/B169). Kant himself acknowledges that such a relationship is vexing—
asserting, in metaphysics lectures delivered shortly after the publication of KrV, that ‘The 
difference between power [Kraft] and faculty [Vermögen] is difficult to determine’ (LM 29:823).  
In the definition of the power of judgment just mentioned, Kant defines the new power as a faculty, 
leaving to one to wonder whether it is ultimately a Kraft or a Vermögen (cf. LA 25:537-538). To 
make matters worse, in a passage from KU that Longuenesse draws attention to (and which I deal 
with in §4), Kant seems to equate Urteilskraft with the Vermögen zu urteilen (5:287).10 In sum, 
 
10 Vermögen zu urteilen itself gets translated as both ‘capacity’ and ‘faculty.’ Longuenesse prefers ‘capacity 
to judge’—suggesting that this better captures the idea of an ‘unactualised potentiality’ (1998, 7). However, 
in their Cambridge translation of KrV, Guyer & Wood translate it as ‘faculty for judging’ (including at 
A81/B107) in order to keep the connection with the Latin facultas, used by Baumgarten. Regrettably, Guyer 
& Wood also—on more than one occasion—translate Urteilskraft as the ‘faculty of judgment’ (KrV A295-
6/B352). See also Guyer’s translation of Refl 2133 (16:247).  
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one is hard pressed to find in Kant a clear account of the distinction between a faculty and a power 
(Longuenesse 1998, 8). 
Even still, most commentators have taken the difference between a faculty and a power to 
consist in the latter’s ability to actualise the former. Drawing on Kant’s metaphysics lectures, 
Longuenesse maintains that Kant uses these terms in senses taken directly from Baumgarten and 
Wolff. Baumgarten characterises a power [Latin, vis] as ‘the complement to the faculty [facultas],’ 
namely, what is added to the faculty so that the act comes to be (M §220). Wolff uses the example 
of a seated person to make the same point: they have the capacity to stand, which must be 
distinguished from the further capacity which brings it about that they stand (GM §117).11 For 
Kant’s predecessors, then, a Kraft is that through which one takes what is merely potential and 
makes it actual.  
Kant’s discussion of the difference between Vermögen and Kraft in his metaphysics 
lectures lends support to an interpretation in terms of potentiality and actuality. A faculty, he says, 
is ‘the possibility of acting,’ that is, the property of a substance by which it has only the potential 
or tendency for acting, but which lacks a sufficient ground (LM 28:434). By contrast, a power is 
‘a faculty insofar as it suffices for the actuality of an accident [of a substance]’; as the sufficient 
ground of an action, it is thus that which actualises it (LM 29:823-824; see also 28:27, 434, 515, 
656; Refl 3584, 17:72). In the case of judging, then, Longuenesse suggests that we understand the 
Vermögen zu urteilen as ‘[the] possibility or potentiality of forming judgments,’ which is 
 
11 ‘A power [Kraft] should not be confounded with a mere faculty [Vermögen]: for a faculty is only a 
possibility of doing something: on the other hand, since a power is a source of alteration, an endeavor to do 
something must be encountered within a power.’ 
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1986291 
 8 
actualised by Urteilskraft when we judge (1998, 7). The power of judgment is ‘the actualisation 
of the Vermögen zu urteilen under sensory stimulating’ (ibid).12 
While the potentiality/actuality reading is not without problems, I will assume it for the 
purposes of the paper.13 Such a view is at least compatible with the position I defend, as will 
become clear over the course of the discussion. The understanding and reason both provide 
universals, but this is not enough to render judgments. These faculties depend on the power of 
judgment in order for their concepts and rules, respectively, to be applied to particulars. The ability 
to bring forth general representations would in this sense constitute a mere capacity to judge but 
still require a distinct power that can actualise this potentiality. This would explain why Kant 
introduces the power of judgment—namely, because he recognises a gap in his initial division of 
 
12 For now, it is worth noting that Longuenesse opens her book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, by 
explicitly stating that the title does not refer to Urteilskraft (1998, 8). Indeed, the book focuses almost 
exclusively on the Vermögen zu urteilen, with very little to say about the Kraft of which it is partly 
composed. This points to a more general neglect of the power of judgment in her work, which we will see 
more clearly in §3. In subsequent work, she reiterates her claim that Urteilskraft is the actualisation of the 
Vermögen zu urteilen, while also adding the rather cryptic comment that: ‘for that matter, so are the two 
other components of the understanding [in the broad sense],’ referring to the understanding (in the narrow 
sense) and reason (2005, 142). Boyle (2020) suggests that Longuenesse conflates the capacity/power 
distinction with the power/act distinction—failing to delineate between those conditions that enable the 
power to perform its operations, on the one hand, and the products of this operation, on the other (132fn21). 
13 While Kant cites Wolff and Baumgarten sympathetically on this matter in some of his metaphysics 
lectures, he also argues against their idea that a power is that which contains the ground of the actuality of 
an act, contending instead that it is the ‘connection’ [nexus] or ‘relation’ between  ground and its 
consequence (LM 28:25-27, 261; 29:771). Thus it is not clear that Kant simply adopts the framework of 
Wolff and Baumgarten regarding the distinction between a faculty and a power. Heßbrüggen-Walter claims 
that Kant was in fact more influenced by Crusius with respect to these notions (2004, 127-142). More 
problematically, though, such a reading seems to count the power of judgment twice—first as potentiality, 
then as actuality. Recall that Kant sees all three higher cognitive faculties (understanding in the narrow 
sense, the power of judgment, and reason) as making up the Vermögen zu urteilen. Yet, in taking 
Urteilskraft to be the actualisation of this capacity, Longuenesse effectively singles out one component of 
the capacity as the thing which makes it actual. It is unclear what the difference would be between the 
power of judgment qua capacity and the power of judgment as actualising force. One might think that Kant 
would have been better off holding that the capacity to judge consists only in understanding and reason, 
reserving the power of judgment for the role of actualising it. 
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the higher cognitive faculties, and comes to see the power of judgment as playing a crucial role in 
making judgments possible.  
 
2. The distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment [KU], Kant provides a definition of the power 
of judgment that is similar to that of KrV: ‘the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained 
under the universal’ (5:179; cf. FI 20:211). However, Kant now makes a distinction within the 
power of judgment—between what he calls its ‘determining’ [bestimmend] and ‘reflecting’ 
[reflectirend] use. The distinction hinges on whether the universal is given prior to our encounter 
with a particular.14  If it is given, then judgment is determining. We can take this to involve 
something like predication, that is, attributing a property to a thing. For example, I might possess 
the concepts ‘red’ and ‘coffee mug,’ and thus say of some object in front of me that it is a red 
coffee mug. However, if no universal is given, then we must search for one. To continue the 
example: the first time I saw a coffee mug, I lacked the concept necessary to see it as a coffee 
mug. It was only after reflecting on the particular object as such (and presumably, other coffee 
mugs) that I arrived at the empirical concept ‘coffee mug.’ In seeking out a universal for the 
particular, the power of judgment is reflecting.15 
 
14 Kant parenthetically glosses the term ‘universal’ as a rule, principle, or law. He also mentions concepts 
in FI (20:211). We can take all these notions to be universals in the sense relevant for the definition of the 
power of judgment—i.e., as things under which particulars can be subsumed. 
15 In addition to this newfound distinction within the power of judgment, there is a further innovation—
namely, the power of judgment (like the other two higher cognitive faculties) is now governed by a 
principle, which he describes as the presupposition that nature is purposive for our cognitive faculties. 
Commentators have struggled to understand the precise formulation of this principle, in part due to Kant’s 
many characterisations of the notion of purposiveness throughout the text, as well as the range of 
philosophical problems to which he poses it as a solution. Common to many interpretations, however, is 
the idea that nature admits of being carved up into a hierarchy of empirical concepts by us. I will discuss 
this issue in the final section of this paper, ultimately suggesting that this cannot be an exhaustive 
description of the principle.  
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Immediately after describing reflecting judgment, Kant defines ‘reflection’ in general as 
the comparison or holding together of my representations with each other or up against my 
cognitive faculties (FI 20:211).16 The notion of reflection appears in a variety of contexts in 
Kant’s philosophy, each with its own specific connotation—though arguably all fitting the 
general definition Kant provides. Commentators generally distinguish between two main species 
of reflection, following from Kant’s own definition: logical and transcendental. The most well-
known account of the first kind of reflection is in section 6 of the Jäsche logic. Kant describes 
the threefold activity of comparison/reflection/abstraction as that by which I discover what my 
representations have in common in order to form a concept of an object. Kant thus calls a 
concept a ‘reflected representation’ because its universal or general form originates in (and owes 
itself to) the logical act of reflection (LL 9:91, 94).17 Kant’s main discussion of transcendental 
reflection appears in the Amphiboly chapter of KrV (A260/B316-A263/B319). In this case, we 
are not comparing representations to each other but rather comparing them with their 
corresponding cognitive faculty (i.e., sensibility or understanding). This kind of reflection is 
necessary for making sure that we do not make erroneous judgments—e.g., by failing to treat an 
appearance as rooted in sensibility. 
We should want to know, though, how these various types of reflection relate to the use 
of the reflecting power of judgment. Some commentators use ‘reflection’ and ‘reflecting 
judgment’ interchangeably. For example, Longuenesse, who we will consider more in §3, 
identifies the activity that generates empirical concepts with reflecting judgment: it is ‘a progress 
 
16 In anthropology lectures from the 1770s, Kant describes comparison as the act of ‘holding our 
representations together’ [Vorstellungen zusammen zu halten]—and goes on to define the power of 
judgment as a faculty of comparison [Vergleichung] (FA 25:515). 
17 For more on Kant’s account of logical reflection and its role in the formation of concepts, see Newton 
2015. 
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from sensible representations to discursive thought: the formation of concepts through 
comparison/reflection/abstraction, which is just what reflective judgment is: finding the universal 
for the particular’ (1998, 164-165; emphasis mine). In other words, she sees logical, 
transcendental, and aesthetic reflection as ultimately involving the same activity—namely, 
seeking out a universal for a particular.  
Makkreel (2006), however, draws a sharp distinction between these three activities. For 
Makkreel, the logical act of reflection that leads to the formation of concepts is not an act of 
judgment at all, but rather an act of the understanding. And while this act is solely concerned 
with the relation of representations to each other, transcendental reflection is concerned with the 
relation of representations to us and our faculties. In contrast to both of these, he thinks, 
reflecting judgment operates at a higher level—namely, on already existing concepts, laws, and 
determinate cognitions in order to unify them into a system; he thus sees it as closely related to 
the interests of the faculty of reason. There are certainly similarities between the two, he says, 
but they do not reduce to a ‘common procedure,’ as Longuenesse contends (2006, 225). While 
now is not the place to discuss the details of Makkreel’s argument, I will simply note that I see 
no reason why we cannot take reflecting judgment to be something that precedes and helps to 
facilitate cognition as well as something that supervenes on fully formed cognitions in order to 
coordinate them into a coherent whole.  
All of this is complicated by the fact that Kant takes aesthetic judgment to be the 
paradigmatic exercise of reflecting judgment—an activity in which no concept is found. Kant 
refers to this as ‘mere reflection,’ ‘merely reflecting’ judgment, and a ‘judgment of mere 
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reflection’ (FI 20:220-221).18 This, combined with Kant’s decision to define ‘reflection’ 
immediately after ‘reflecting judgment,’ suggests that the two terms are not mutually exclusive. 
The distinct but relate senses of these notions, for Kant, is not an issue that I can take up in detail 
here—though it is certainly a matter worthy of further consideration.19 For the purposes of the 
discussion, I opt for a broad conception of reflecting judgment that includes but is not limited to 
logical reflection. That is, rather than taking logical reflection to exhaustively describe the 
activity of reflecting judgment, as Longuenesse does, or sharply distinguishing the two, like 
Makkreel, I suggest that we see logical, transcendental, and aesthetic reflection as nothing but 
different instances of reflecting judgment.  
Returning to the issue of the relationship of determining and reflecting judgment, a 
philosophical question presents itself—namely, what is common to both operations such that 
they can be seen as species of a singular faculty of the mind? This question arises naturally in in 
considering the two different mental exercises at play, respectively—on the one hand, applying a 
rule to a particular of which it is an instance; on the other, searching for a rule for a particular. 
On the face of it, these seem like vastly different acts of the mind, hardly deserving of being put 
together. Applying a rule sounds rather mechanical and rote, while seeking out a rule sounds 
creative and free. There seems to be, as Zammito puts it, a ‘radical incongruity between the 
reasoning involved in discovery (or invention) and the reasoning involved in proof’ (1992, 167). 
Thus we should want to know how Kant conceives of these as being unified under the power of 
judgment in general. 
 
18 Other passages where Kant uses these different terms include: FI 20:223-225, 229-232, 244; KU 5:179, 
190-192, 194, 239, 244, 249, 253, 267. 
19 Gorodeisky (2021) treats the varieties of reflection across Kant’s Critical philosophy (including the 
practical philosophy) in her forthcoming entry to The Cambridge Kant Lexicon. 
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There is hardly a well-defined position on the relationship between determining and 
reflecting judgment, nor is there consensus as to what it amounts to.20 Commentators usually 
take it to refer to two distinct ways of exercising a single power, though this is often taken for 
granted and rarely argued for. For Guyer, determining and reflecting judgment are ‘two different 
ways in which judgment can operate,’ which are ‘numerically distinct and independent from 
each other’ (1997, 35; 2003, 2).21 Moreover, Guyer suggests that determining and reflecting 
judgment are unified insofar as they both involve ‘matching’ particulars and universals (1997, 
35). Zuckert glosses these as ‘parallel’ operations insofar as ‘we do the ‘same thing’ in these 
activities, only in different ‘directions’ (start with the universal, or start with the particular)’ 
 
20 This includes debate about the historical question of precisely when Kant arrived at his notion of 
reflecting judgment. Since the distinction between determining and reflecting judgment appears for the first 
time in KU, one might think that Kant initially conceived of the power of judgment only as determining, 
coming to possess a notion of it as reflecting later on. For example, Kaag claims that ‘In the Critique of 
Pure Reason Kant seems to have envisioned only determinate judgment,’ and that Kant ‘comes to 
recognise’ reflecting judgment by the time he writes KU—'developing an alternative to the determinate 
judgments of the Critique of Pure Reason’ (2014, 39; emphasis his). Similarly, Teufel claims that in KU 
‘Kant now discerns a new cognitive capacity within the power of judgement at large’ (2012, 302). Yet when 
Kant writes his famous 1787 letter to Reinhold describing his plans to write KU, he does not mention his 
‘discovery’ of reflecting judgment. However, among the ‘systematic’ reasons that made him see such a 
critique was necessary is the recognition that the fundamental faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure 
has its own a priori legislative principle, just like the faculties of cognition and desire—a principle provided 
by the power of judgment (Corr 10:514-515). On my view, what Kant discovered was not reflecting 
judgment as such, but rather the autonomy of reflecting judgment (a notion I discuss in more detail in §4). 
What appears in KrV as a subordinate mode of the power of judgment is elevated in KU as the power of 
judgment sans phrase. Additionally, the mainstream view that I consider in the next section provides 
compelling reasons to see an early version of reflecting judgment in KrV. Despite going on to reject this 
view, I concur on this point—as I explain in what follows. 
21 Guyer does qualify his view by noting that when the given universal is a pure category (e.g., causality) 
requiring intermediate concepts (e.g., a specific empirical-causal law) for its application, reflective 
judgment ‘may be needed to find those concepts and thus complete the task assigned to determinant 
judgment’ (2005, 12). Still, for the most part, Guyer thinks that judgment is ‘either determinant or reflective 
but not both’ (ibid).  
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(2007, 72).22 What both Guyer and Zuckert seem to overlook (if not deny) is the potential 
heterogeneity of the respective roles of determining and reflecting judgment. 
 
3. From the ‘moment of reflection’ to the determinative ideal 
In contrast to the commentators just mentioned, Longuenesse maintains that there is ‘no 
strict dichotomy’ between determining and reflecting judgment (2005, 214). Not only this, she 
thinks that they are in fact ‘complementary’ and ‘inseparable’ (1998, 231). Though her account 
is not explicitly framed in terms of the problem of the relationship between the two, it is certainly 
motivated by such concerns. Longuenesse sees no major change in Kant’s conception of 
judgment from KrV to KU, but instead a deep continuity between the two texts.23 And yet, as I 
will show, her account achieves the unification of determining and reflecting judgment only by 
making determination the telos of reflection. Longuenesse boldly claims that ‘all reflection is 
geared toward concept formation’ (2003, 146; her emphasis). For this reason, she speaks of 
aesthetic—i.e., merely reflecting—judgment as a case of ‘reflection failing to reach 
determination under a concept’ (1998, 164). On Longuenesse’s account, then, all acts of the 
power of judgment have what I will refer to as a determinative ideal. After discussing her view 
in more detail, I will show why this cannot be squared with Kant’s larger systematic and critical 
aims in KU.  
 
22 Similarly, Allison observes that the text suggests that these capacities share ‘a common concern of 
connecting universals to particulars, which they attempt to do in diametrically opposed ways’—though this 
turns out not to be his considered view, as the next section will reveal (2001, 17-18). 
23 Longuenesse speaks of a ‘profound accord between the first and third Critique in respect of their 
conception of judgment,’ despite the reflective aspect being ‘somewhat obscured’ due to the former’s 
‘determinative focus’ (1998, 197). Likewise, Allison writes: ‘Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit 
formulation of this distinction in the first Critique…the contrast that Kant draws in the Introductions to the 
third Critique [does not mark] a major change in his conception of judgment’ (2001, 17).  
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 Longuenesse’s position departs from the observation that Kant refers to aesthetic and 
teleological judgments as ‘merely’ [bloß; nur] reflecting, which suggests that the proper contrast 
is with those that are both determining and reflecting. By reading the Amphiboly chapter’s 
concepts of comparison in light of the logical forms of judgment, she demonstrates that 
reflection is already present in KrV: ‘at the heart of the first Critique we find a concept of 
judgment in which reflection plays an essential role’ (1998, 163). She articulates this role as 
follows: ‘All determinative judgments must have a reflective component: even if we have 
available the relevant concepts under which to subsume individual objects, there is always an 
initial stage at which we apprehend what is given to our senses and grope…for the relevant 
concept’ (2003, 145). In other words, determining and reflecting judgment cannot be entirely 
pulled apart because the empirical concepts that function as rules for the former are produced by 
the latter.24 Allison, who follows Longuenesse in this regard, makes the point succinctly: All 
determining judgments contain a ‘moment’ of reflection (2001, 18).  
Not only does the application of determinate concepts presuppose reflection, but all 
reflection is ‘geared toward’ concept formation (2003, 146). Longuenesse describes reflecting 
judgment as ‘the use of the power of judgment by means of which empirical concepts and 
empirical laws are formed’—while merely reflecting judgment is ‘the use in which the play of 
imagination and understanding does not lead to a concept’ (2005, 288). So, while all empirical 
cognition presupposes reflecting judgment, ‘not all reflective judgment leads to cognition, 
namely to the formation of a concept’ (2003, 145). Hence, Longuenesse sees concept formation 
as intrinsically directed at facilitating cognition.  
 
24 Longuenesse also sees reflection as essential aspect of our acquiring the pure categories. However, I will 
not discuss this aspect of her position here because it is both controversial and not directly related to my 
concerns. 
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The crux of our disagreement lies in the idea that all reflection aims at determination. 
Longuenesse’s account may unify the power of judgment, but one might fear what this means for 
those instances where ‘reflecting can never arrive at conceptual determination’ (1998, 164; her 
emphasis). Of merely reflecting judgments, Longuenesse says: ‘the effort of the activity of 
judgment to form concepts fails’ (ibid; also her emphasis). This normative language has 
implications for the status of aesthetic judgments, the paradigm case of merely reflecting 
judgment. Longuenesse is committed to saying that these are failed attempts at making 
theoretical judgments—a less than ideal outcome of the activity of reflection.25 She does not 
seem troubled by this consequence, though she tries to soften it by saying that there can be 
fruitful or ‘welcome’ failures (2003,146).  
It should be noted that even Allison, despite being generally on board with 
Longuenesse’s account of Kant’s theory of judgment, expresses some hesitancy at the idea of 
aesthetic judgment as a ‘failed cognition,’ along with what he sees as a fundamental assumption 
of Longuenesse’s—‘that reflection is always initially motivated by a cognitive aim’ (2003, 183). 
However, like Longuenesse, Allison describes the activity of reflection as ‘primarily directed 
toward the formation of concepts’ (2001, 45). What’s more, regarding the unity of the power of 
judgment, Allison follows Longuenesse in affirming that ‘reflection and determination are best 
seen as complementary poles of a unified activity of judgment (the subsumption of particulars 
under universals), rather than as two only tangentially related activities’ (ibid, 44; emphasis 
 
25 To carry forward a point made earlier: Since Makkreel does not see logical reflection as an instance of 
reflecting judgment, he rejects the idea—which I happen to share with Longuenesse—that reflecting 
judgment is already present in all acts of determining judgment. It is reflection, he thinks, that precedes and 
contributes to determining judgment, whereas reflecting judgment only ever follows determining 
judgments. Nonetheless, we both agree that Longuenesse is wrong to see aesthetic judgment as ‘a deficient 
version’ of reflecting judgment (2006, 224).  
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mine). All of this suggests that he too sees the subsumption of a particular under a universal as 
the ultimate aim of all acts of judgment. 
Nonetheless, Allison seems to want to resist the idea of a determinative ideal for the 
power of judgment: ‘The suggestion of a failure is out of place here, since the free play of the 
faculties in such reflection does not aim at such determination, and where there is no aim there 
can be no failure’ (2001, 353-354). Allison stops short of asking the question of what aims 
reflection might have apart from determination—that is, what it might mean for aesthetic 
judgments to be a success. Still, one senses in his remarks the implicit realisation that one cannot 
simply conclude from the fact that an activity is aimed at concept formation that it is also aimed 
at conceptual determination.  
Now, we need not take issue with the view, held by both Longuenesse and Allison, that 
cognitive judgments are both determining and reflecting. In the context of KrV, reflecting 
judgment aims at determining some object through a concept. But what is true of its operations 
here cannot be said of its activity in general. As we will see, on the view that I defend, the claim 
that ‘there is no determination without reflection’ is also true, but for very different reasons 
(2005, 231). Instead of making reflecting judgment subservient to determining judgment, as 
merely a necessary condition on it, I will argue that reflecting judgment in fact takes precedence 
over determining judgment. 
What we should take issue with is the idea that reflecting judgment just is an activity 
aimed at forming empirical concepts and nothing more—that these efforts exhaust its capacities 
and ends. This treats the power of judgment as a mere handmaiden of the understanding, serving 
its needs but with no legitimate needs of its own. This would simply make it a species of the 
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understanding.26 Moreover, limiting it merely to this function indexes its normativity to the 
normativity of another faculty, making its aims only whatever the aims of that faculty are. But 
this is incompatible with the fact that the power of judgment is an independent and autonomous 
faculty with its own a priori principle that governs its activity.  
Longuenesse makes much of a passage from KU where Kant tells us that reflection is 
operative in KrV with ‘no special principle,’ receiving all of its ‘directions’ from the laws of the 
understanding (FI 20:212). Yet if in KU it continues to receive its orders thusly, then it cannot be 
considered as the truly self-sufficient capacity of the mind that it is. In sum, Longuenesse’s 
account cannot be squared with Kant’s larger systematic and critical aims in KU. For it struggles 
to explain the necessity of KU—that is, a critique of the power of judgment. At stake, then, is 
nothing less than the very meaning of the notion of a higher cognitive faculty, for Kant.  
 
4. Reflection as a kind of subsumption: the autonomy of reflecting judgment 
I have argued that casting reflecting judgment only in terms of its contribution to 
determining judgment results in the prioritisation of the latter over the former. I now want to 
argue for the inverse: reflecting judgment takes precedence over determining judgment—in 
particular, by laying exclusive claim to being the autonomous higher cognitive faculty called ‘the 
power of judgment.’27 After making the case for this view, I discuss (in §5) what this means for 
the status of determining judgment.  
 
26 I have focused here on theoretical/cognitive judgments, where the understanding is legislative and affords 
us cognition of nature, since this is the relevant faculty for Longuenesse. Yet one should expect that what I 
say here equally applies to practical/moral judgments, where it is the faculty of reason that tells us how to 
use our freedom. This is important for my discussion of the heteronomy of determining judgment in the 
next two sections, where what is salient is that another faculty gives the rule to the power of judgment. 
27 The uniquely reflecting nature of the power of judgment has not gone entirely unnoticed. Most recently, 
Teufel (2012) has argued that the power of judgment which undergoes critique in 1790 is the reflecting 
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We can start by looking at Kant’s notion of a higher cognitive faculty. As early as the 
first edition of KrV, Kant recognises three higher cognitive faculties: understanding, the power of 
judgment, and reason (A131/B169). Though he does not develop an account of what a higher 
cognitive faculty is there, by KU he is committed to the following claim: insofar as something is 
a higher cognitive faculty, it has its own a priori principle—which we discover through a 
critique of this faculty. Moreover, if something is a higher cognitive faculty, then it is 
autonomous—giving itself its own law and so only beholden to it in its pure activity (KU 5:196). 
In short, ‘a faculty has a higher form when it finds in itself the law of its own exercise’ (Deleuze 
1984, 4).  
Kant declares at the outset of the KU that the present task is to discover whether the 
power of judgment, as the ‘intermediary’ between understanding and reason, might also have ‘its 
own special principle,’ which would give it ‘a well-founded claim to a place in the general 
critique of the higher faculties of cognition’ (KU 5:168; FI 20:244). Once such a task has been 
proven to be warranted, Kant then proceeds to affirm that, ‘The division of a critique of the 
power of judgment…must be grounded on the distinction that it is not the determining but only 
the reflecting power of judgment that has its own principles a priori’ (FI 20:248). 
Unsurprisingly, Kant then concludes this final section of FI, concerning the division of the text, 
by describing what will follow as ‘The critique of the reflecting power of judgment’—divided 
 
power of judgment alone. However, despite our convergence on this view, we diverge in many other 
respects—though I cannot deal directly with these here. In addition to seeing reflecting judgment as a 
relatively late addition to Kant’s theory of judgment (see my footnote 20), Teufel also contends that it 
always acts ‘in the service of conceptual cognition,’ which it has ‘the aim of enabling’ (323). This leads me 
to think that his view fares no better than Longuenesse’s, ultimately committing him likewise to a 
determinative ideal. Still, his paper is helpfully shifts us away from the mainstream view. Nuzzo does not 
provide an argument for this, though she does affirm that ‘the Urteilskraft that occupies the third Critique 
can only be the reflective faculty of judgment,’ even going on to describe it as ‘an autonomous cognitive 
faculty’ (2005, 166). See also Macmillan (1912, 39-59). 
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into two parts: aesthetic and teleological (FI 20:251; emphasis mine). Kant says that the former 
kinds of judgments, which he takes to be paradigmatic of merely reflecting judgment, must be 
based ‘in a rule of the higher faculty of cognition, in this case, namely, in the rule of the power of 
judgment, which is thus legislative with regard to the conditions of reflection a priori, and 
demonstrates autonomy’ (FI 20:225).  
Kant distinguishes the autonomy of reflecting judgment from the autonomy of the other 
two higher cognitive faculties—even introducing a special term to mark the distinctive self-
legislation of the power of judgment: heautonomy. Though Kant only uses this term twice in KU, 
his remarks on it are instructive. The power of judgment ‘prescribes a law, not to nature (as 
autonomy), but [solely] to itself (as heautonomy)’ (KU 5:185-186; FI 20:225). Unlike 
understanding and reason, the power of judgment ‘can claim no field of objects as its domain’ 
(KU 5:177). Thus the idea of purposiveness ‘serves as a principle, merely for the subject’ (FI 
20:205). The principle of purposiveness is not a principle for judging about objects, but instead 
only governs the subject’s own activity of judging. As Floyd observes, what is distinct about the 
autonomy of reflecting judgment is that it ‘can only be exercised relative to itself’ and its own 
activities (1998, 205). It is with this in mind that we can approach Kant’s rather cryptic assertion 
that in mere reflection, the power of judgment is ‘itself, subjectively, both object as well as law’ 
(KU 5:288). For as we are about to see, this refers to the kind of subsumption that takes place in 
reflection, whereby it provides the principle under which to subsume its own free activity. 
The special autonomy of reflecting judgment gets invoked elsewhere in KU. In both the 
Antinomies of Aesthetic and Teleological Judgment, Kant notes that such conflicts only arise for 
the merely reflecting power of judgment because only it (and not determining judgment) is a 
higher faculty of the mind. In his discussion of the aesthetic case, Kant goes as far as to describe 
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antinomial conflict as such as arising from each of the three higher cognitive faculties with 
respect to their unique principles: ‘That there are three kinds of antinomy is grounded in the fact 
that there are three cognitive faculties—understanding, the power of judgment, and reason—each 
of which (as a higher cognitive faculty) must have its a priori principles’ (KU 5:345). In his 
resolution to these antinomies, Kant notes that the appearance of a conflict disappears when we 
no longer confuse the autonomy of reflecting judgment with the heteronomy of determining 
judgment, ‘which has to conform to the laws given by the understanding’ (KU 5:389). 
The distinction between the autonomy of reflecting judgment and the heteronomy of 
determining judgment can be traced back to two different ways in which the imagination and 
understanding relate to each other in an act of judgment. When the understanding provides the 
rule (either in the form of a pure category or an empirical concept), the imagination apprehends 
the sensible given in a way that allows it to be subsumed under the rule. This is determining 
judgment. When no rule is provided, the faculties are in free play: The imagination does not 
connect what it combines in intuition to a determinate concept, but instead freely engages with 
the understanding. This is reflecting judgment. A synthesis of the manifold occurs in both 
instances, though it is only in the former that it is subsumed under a concept.  
What also occurs in both instances is subsumption. In the broadest sense, subsumption is 
the act of bringing one thing under another, and it is always a ‘function’ of the power of 
judgment (KrV A132/B171, A247/B304). In KrV’s Schematism, the power of judgment enables 
the manifold of intuition to be brought under the pure concepts of the understanding 
(A137/B176-A142/B181). In KpV’s Typic, the power of judgment subsumes a possible action 
under the moral law (5:68). Since a universal is given in both cases, the power of judgment is 
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determining.28 Indeed, one might be inclined to think that only determining judgment involves 
subsumption—for there must be two things present for such an act to occur. In addition, Kant 
shifts from defining the power of judgment as the faculty of ‘subsuming’ a particular under a 
universal in KrV to that of ‘thinking’ the former under the latter in KU.29  
Yet in KU Kant also speaks of reflection as also involving subsumption. Call this 
reflection-subsumption in contrast with the more familiar determination-subsumption. Unlike 
determination-subsumption, reflection-subsumption is not the subsumption of an intuition under 
a concept. As a first pass at understanding the notion of reflection-subsumption, we can recall 
Kant’s general definition of reflection—as the comparison and holding together of one’s 
representations either with each other (logical) or with one’s cognitive faculties 
(transcendental)—and think of it this as an instance of the latter.  
The most detailed description of the nature of reflection-subsumption appears in section 
35 of KU, where Kant lays out the special principle of aesthetic judgment. These judgments lack 
an objective principle under which to bring a representation of an object, yet a subsumption still 
occurs: 
Now since no concept of the object is here the ground of the judgment, it can consist only in 
the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation by means of which 
an object is given) under the condition that the understanding in general advance from intuition 
to concepts (5:287). 
 
28 Kant also discusses subsumption in the case of the inferences of reason—specifically, in the minor 
premise, where the power of judgment subsumes the condition of a possible judgment under a universal 
rule (i.e., the major premise) (KrV A330/B386; cf. A300/B357). 
29 It is also worth noting that in the unpublished introduction to KU, as well as both logic and metaphysics 
lectures from the early 1790s, Kant continues to define the power of judgment in general as a faculty of 
‘subsumption’ (FI 20:201; LL 28:703; LM 28:693).  
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It is not immediately clear how we should make sense of the idea of subsuming one faculty 
under another. In general, Kant’s notion of subsumption is not well understood.30 As Guyer 
observes, subsumption usually pertains to representations (e.g., intuitive representations under 
discursive ones; lower-level representations under higher or more general ones, and so on) 
(1997, 80). But what this passage suggests is that the distinction between determining and 
reflecting judgment cannot be between subsumptive and non-subsumptive judgments, but rather 
between two kinds of subsumption. The task, then, is to understand what it means for reflecting 
judgment to have a subsumptive structure or function.  
 Before attempting to solve this problem, we must complicate it a bit further. When 
describing this peculiar subsumption, Kant affirms that an aesthetic judgment is ‘grounded only 
on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general’ (KU 5:287). This in fact echoes a 
remark that Kant makes earlier, in FI: that when no determinate concept is available, we 
‘subsume’ the representation of an object under the ‘subjective conditions’ of the power of 
judgment (20:225). There, Kant describes the ‘subjective conditions’ of judgment as the 
agreement of the imagination and understanding in mere reflection. In section 35 (in the sentence 
immediately following the above quote), he establishes an identity relation between these and the 
power of judgment itself: ‘The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty for judging 
itself [das Vermögen zu urteilen selbst], or the power of judgment [Urteilskraft]’ (5:287). 
 
30 Despite Kant’s employment of the concept of subsumption throughout KU, commentators generally refer 
to it only when discussing KrV and determining judgment. For example, the entry on ‘subsumption’ in A 
Kant Dictionary  only cites KrV, leaving the false impression that it is only a relevant notion for judgment 
in the cognitive context (Caygill 1995, 381). Some commentators have even gone so far as to conflate 
determination and subsumption (Allison, 2001, 5). While the former is an instance of the latter, they are not 
coexistensive for Kant. One notable exception is Bacin, whose recent entry on ‘subsumption’ in the Kant-
Lexicon acknowledges that in KU—specifically, in the judgment of taste—a ‘non-logical’ [nicht-logische] 
subsumption takes place (2015, 2213-2214). 
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Unfortunately, this only raises further questions—among them, how can the condition of a 
judgment be the same as the power of judgment?  
For now, however, this set of identity claims forms the basis of a transitive argument—
starting with Kant’s identification in FI of merely reflecting judgment with the subjective 
conditions of judgment (‘of the objective use of the power of judgment in general’): the latter is 
‘constituted’ by the free play of the imagination and understanding (20:223-224). From section 
35, we know that Kant identifies the subjective conditions of judgment with the power of 
judgment itself. This would suggest that the merely reflecting power of judgment is the power of 
judgment. Of course, the identity claim in section 35 is made through the intermediary concept 
of the faculty of judging; that is, Kant seems to think this is the same as the power of judgment. 
Conveniently, Kant elsewhere equates the faculty of judging with reflecting judgment: ‘The 
reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging’ 
[Beurteilungsvermögen] (FI 20:211). Accordingly, we can conclude that the reflecting power of 
judgment and the power of judgment are identical.  
 We should now look at the remainder of what Kant says in section 35, where the 
subjective conditions of judgment are again described in terms of the harmony of the faculties. In 
the absence of a concept (i.e., an objective condition), the imagination’s combination of a 
manifold agrees with the understanding’s presentation of unity in a concept. Thus, Kant says, 
reflecting judgment also has a ‘principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of 
the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts 
(i.e., the understanding)’ (KU 5:287).31 With no discursive rule at our disposal, we judge by 
 
31 cf. Remark in section 38: subsuming not the imagination under the understanding, but our representation 
of an object under the ‘relation’ of the imagination and understanding (KU 5:290). See also a passage from 
the metaphysics lectures, where Kant describes the activity of the ‘merely reflecting’ power of judgment as 
follows: ‘We subsume merely under our faculty of concepts’ (LM 28:675-676).  
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means of a feeling that the product of the free imagination is purposive for the understanding in 
its lawfulness. The autonomous nature of the activity of reflecting judgment consists in the fact 
that it must ‘subsume under a law that is not yet given and which in fact is only a principle for 
reflection on objects’ (KU 5:385). Because it cannot be lawless, it must provide itself with its 
own principle. This, of course, is in contrast with determining judgment, which Kant says 
‘merely subsumes under given laws or concepts’ (ibid). But what are we to make of the 
distinction between the ‘mere’ subsumption of determining judgment and the subsumption that 
takes place in reflection?  
Kant’s first mention of ‘mere’ subsumption appears in FI by way of a contrast with the 
reflecting judgment’s efforts to find the universal for the particular (20:210). Within a matter of 
pages, Kant seems to make contradictory statements regarding subsumption. First, after 
motivating that the idea that because judgment mediates the understanding and reason, each with 
their own a priori legislative principle, ‘by analogy,’ it might too have its own, Kant asserts: 
‘Yet the power of judgment is such a faculty of cognition, not at all self-sufficient, that it 
provides neither concepts, like the understanding, nor ideas, like reason, of any object at all, 
since it is a faculty merely for subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere’ (FI 20:202). 
However, only two sections later, Kant claims that the power of judgment does have its own 
transcendental principle, which is to say that ‘[it] is not merely a faculty for subsuming the 
particular under the general (whose concept is given), but is also, conversely, one for finding the 
general for the particular’ (FI 20:209-210).  
Out of context, these statements are flatly opposed. However, taken in context, there is a 
clear way of reconciling them. Kant is here motivating the project of KU, and the necessity of a 
critique of the power of judgment. I take his first claim to be the default view based on a 
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‘systematic representation’ of the three higher cognitive faculties (FI 20:201). An a priori 
attempt to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of the mind would never arrive at the notion of a 
special principle for the power of judgment. A conceptual analysis of the capacity to subsume 
one thing under another does not suggest a special law, especially insofar as this capacity sits ‘in 
between’ the faculty of rules and principles; from this solely mediating function, it generates no 
lawful content of its own. However, when considered concerning the problem of how experience 
of nature as an interconnected system of empirical laws is possible for human beings, the power 
of judgment reveals that it does have its own principle: the presupposition that nature admits of 
being comprehended by us in its thoroughgoing unity. Such an assumption—a transcendental 
principle—only comes into view when we consider how particular experience, for us, is possible.  
Recall that Longuenesse emphasises the ‘merely’ in merely reflecting judgment to show 
that the proper contrast is with those judgments that are both determining and reflecting. In a 
similar way, then, we can contrast ‘merely’ subsumptive judgments with this more fundamental 
kind of subsumption at play in reflection. This allows us to confer new meaning on the initial 
idea that reflection is a condition on determination: The activity of reflecting judgment includes 
but is not limited to those which serve to bring about cognition. On my account, the reflecting 
power of judgment is a capacity for purposive subsumption which, insofar as it constitutes the 
subjective condition for all acts of judgment, underlies even those acts of judgment which aim at 
determination. It is to these acts of the power of judgment that I now turn. 
 
5. Heteronomy and ‘mere’ subsumption: the status of determining judgment 
One may still wonder where this gets us with respect to the original problem regarding 
the relationship between determining and reflecting judgment. In arguing that the power of 
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judgment just is reflecting judgment, it may seem that I have rejected the problem altogether. To 
be sure, I motivated the problem by showing how commentators tend to treat these as two co-
equal species of the power of judgment. But even in rejecting the idea that they are on par with 
each other, I must still say something about how they are related to each other—and thus the 
status of determining judgment on the account I have advanced, where reflecting judgment 
uniquely characterises the faculty of the mind that Kant calls ‘the power of judgment.’ In short, 
my claim is that determining judgment is the result of the co-operation of the reflecting power of 
judgment with another higher cognitive faculty.  
  Kant opens the Critique of Teleological Judgment by noting that if we were to employ 
the concept of a natural end constitutively rather than as a merely regulative principle, then it 
would be a determining judgment—‘in which case, however, it would not in fact properly belong 
to the power of judgment at all’ (KU 5:361). This is because, in this instance, the faculty of 
reason would be providing the law. Instead, Kant insists, we should take it to be a concept of the 
power of judgment, akin to the concept of natural beauty in the aesthetic case. 
 Determining judgment always requires the contribution of another higher cognitive 
faculty. In the case of cognitive judgments, it requires the understanding, which Kant defines in 
FI as ‘the faculty for the cognition of the general (of rules)’ (20:201). The specific contribution is 
in the form of a law or principle to guide the subsumption of a particular. As I have already 
noted, Kant says that determining judgment ‘merely subsumes under given laws or concepts’ 
(KU 5:385; emphasis mine). Because it does not have its own principle, it has ‘no autonomy’ 
(ibid; cf. KU 5:183, 5:389). For this reason, the very idea of a critique of the power of judgment, 
Kant says, must be based on the fact that ‘it is not the determining but only the reflecting power 
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of judgment that has its own principles a priori; [and] that the former operates only 
schematically, under laws of another faculty (the understanding)’ (FI 20:248).32  
This is true for both the transcendental and the empirical power of judgment. In the first 
case, judgment has ‘nothing to do’ but ‘provide the condition of subsumption under the a priori 
concept of the understanding that has been laid down for it’ (KU 5:183). The transcendental 
power of judgment, which Kant discusses in KrV, ‘contains the conditions for subsuming under 
categories,’ and is thus that which ‘merely named the conditions of sensible intuition under 
which a given concept, as a law of the understanding, could be given reality’ (KU 5:385). 
Similarly, when an empirical concept—the product of the ‘moment’ of reflection discussed 
above—is given, the power of judgment merely subsumes: ‘the underlying concept of the object 
prescribes the rule to the power of judgment and thus plays the role of the principle’ (FI 20:211). 
For example, the understanding provides the concept of a flower as a rule for the imagination, 
which synthesises a given manifold in such a way that allows it to be subsumed under that 
concept. 
Still, it may seem as if the power of judgment plays a markedly different role in the case 
of determining judgment. One may even see here a new instance of the original problem: what is 
it about both reflection-subsumption and determination-subsumption that merits the name 
‘subsumption’? I suggest that we understand determining judgment as a species of the capacity 
for purposive subsumption—characteristic of the power of judgment in general, which I have 
argued is reflecting. Here too I hold up my representations (in this instance, a concept and an 
 
32 In one unpublished note, Kant distinguishes between ‘inferences of the understanding’ and ‘inferences 
of the power of judgment’ (Refl 3200, 16:709). The former always proceed from the universal to the 
particular, and never from the particular to the universal, Kant says, ‘because they are supposed to provide 
determining judgments’; the latter, by contrast, go from the particular to the universal and are ‘thus kinds 
of reflecting judgment’ (ibid). See also Refl 3282 (16:757), the only other unpublished note where Kant 
explicitly discusses the distinction between determining and reflecting judgment.  
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intuition) and perceive their agreement; that is, I see whether they go together. For example, I 
recognise that my intuition of a flower ought to be subsumed under the concept ‘flower’—rather 
than, say, the concept ‘dog.’ And, indeed, there is no rule to tell me how to subsume in this way. 
It is in this sense that the power of judgment is reflecting even when determining.  
It is also in this sense that reflecting judgment enjoys a priority over determining 
judgment. I have spoken of reflecting judgment taking precedence over determining judgment, 
mainly to denote the way the former functions as a condition of possibility for the latter. Though 
I have rejected what I claim is Longuenesse’s subordination of reflecting judgment, and even 
characterised my own position as the inverse, this should not be taken to imply a subordination 
of determining judgment in the sense of being inferior to reflecting judgment.  
To summarise these past two sections: determining judgment does not meet the criteria 
for being a higher cognitive faculty. For as we have seen, a higher cognitive faculty is 
autonomous, giving itself its own law. Kant is clear that determining judgment is heteronomous, 
for its law is always given by another higher cognitive faculty. It is thus not on par with 
reflecting judgment. By contrast, reflecting judgment, in providing itself with its own principle, 
demonstrates autonomy. Hence, it alone can lay claim to being the higher cognitive faculty that 
Kant calls ‘the power of judgment.’  
 
6. Purposive unity and the aims of mere reflection 
I have shown that if Kant is committed to the idea that the reflecting power of judgment 
is a higher cognitive faculty in its own right, then it must have aims irreducible to those of the 
understanding—interests that are independent from any ideal of determination. Its contribution to 
the genesis of empirical concepts must therefore be understood within the larger aim of attaining 
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purposive unity; we must ‘zoom out’ and view acts of determining judgment as but one species 
of its purposive activity. For we can only have insight into the activity of merely reflecting 
judgment when we examine it solely under the guidance of the law that it gives itself—removing 
the influence of the other higher cognitive faculties, which place demands on it in the form of 
rules and principles for it to follow.  
The foregoing account yields new questions regarding the nature of the reflecting power 
of judgment, which form the basis for further investigations. First, how should we formulate the 
transcendental principle that governs mere reflection? While I have discussed merely reflecting 
judgment as a kind of subsumption, I have not yet said much about what it means for such an 
activity to be purposive. That is, I have focused on the nature of the activity itself, and not yet on 
the rule that governs such an activity. This is a tricky matter, owing in no small part to the 
paradox that lies at the heart of the very idea of a rule for the power of judgment—a faculty that 
is fundamentally not governed by any rules. Still, Kant contends that reflection ‘requires a 
principle just as much as determining’ (FI 20:211).  
It is important to note, as a consequence of my account, what the formulation of this 
principle cannot be: a principle merely to guide reflection in its efforts to form empirical 
concepts. To be sure, Kant sometimes leads one to believe that this articulation of the principle is 
exhaustive (FI 20:211). And it should not be surprising, given her commitment to a 
determinative ideal, that Longuenesse takes this logical purposiveness to be the principle of all 
reflection (2003, 145). That aesthetic judgments are equally governed by logical purposiveness 
explains, for her, why they fail. If my account here is correct, then this cannot be correct—and 
our articulation of the principle of purposiveness must be broad enough to explain how aesthetic 
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judgments and logical acts of reflection alike can be explained as successful exercises under its 
guidance.33 
On my view, what it means for the power of judgment to be guided by the principle of 
purposiveness is for it seek out purposive unity—or, the suitability of two things for each other. 
This it can do only affectively and never discursively (for there can be no rules for how to apply 
rules), which is to say, it bottoms out in a feeling that two things belong together. In reflection-
subsumption, I hold up a product of the imagination, which has not been synthesised according 
to a determinate concept, against the understanding’s condition that such a product be unified in 
the idea of an object in general. Still, since no concept facilitates this subsumption, it rests only 
on the feeling that what is presented is purposive for both faculties. The object thus occasions 
them to discern a particular form in it that suggests it was designed with our judging power in 
mind: ‘the understanding and imagination mutually agree for the advancement of their business, 
and the object will be perceived as purposive merely for the power of judgment, hence the 
purposiveness itself will be considered as merely subjective’ (FI 20:221).  
Finally, what are the aims and ends that reflection pursues when it acts solely under the 
guidance of this principle? As we saw, Longuenesse’s view precludes the possibility that there 
could be anything like successful aesthetic judgments. Hence, it is crucial to spell out the 
intrinsic interests that, I take myself to shown, reflecting judgment must have. For now, we can 
simply consider the way Kant describes the relationship between the imagination and 
understanding when they are in free play. We hold together and perceive their agreement, and we 
 
33 Ginsborg has been criticised for assimilating the norms of aesthetic judgment to those governing 
cognition—in large part due to her preoccupation with showing the insights the former provides for the 
latter (Gorodeisky 2011, 421fn28). Similarly, Zuckert describes the principle of purposiveness ultimately 
as that which ‘governs, justifies, and makes possible our aspirations to empirical knowledge, from its most 
basic form—our ability to formulate any empirical concepts—to its most sophisticated form—a complete, 
systematic science of empirical laws’ (2007, 12; cf. 42-43). 
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witness their reciprocal animation, which serves to ‘strengthen’ and ‘entertain’ our mental 
powers (FI 20:223-224, 241; KU 5:238, 359). Such activity, when not producing concepts to be 
employed in determinate cognition, is ‘merely for the sake of perceiving the suitability of the 
presentation for the harmonious (subjectively purposive) occupation of both cognitive faculties 
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